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* Founding Documents
The Federalist Papers
by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay
Language: English
Submitted by Unknown
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The eighty-five newspaper essays of 1787-88, written as Publius, arguing New York into ratifying the Constitution. Each paper is a chapter, with its author in the title. No. 10 (faction) and No. 51 (checks and balances) are the ones most often quoted. Public domain.

#constitution #founding-documents #history #politics #public-domain

85 chapter(s)

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Chapters
No. 1 · General Introduction (Hamilton)
No. 2 · Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence (Jay)
No. 3 · The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence) (Jay)
No. 4 · The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence) (Jay)
No. 5 · The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence) (Jay)
No. 6 · Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States (Hamilton)
No. 7 · The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States) (Hamilton)
No. 8 · The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States (Hamilton)
No. 9 · The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection (Hamilton)
No. 10 · The Same Subject Continued (The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection) (Madison)
No. 11 · The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy (Hamilton)
No. 12 · The Utility of the Union In Respect to Revenue (Hamilton)
No. 13 · Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government (Hamilton)
No. 14 · Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory Answered (Madison)
No. 15 · The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (Hamilton)
No. 16 · The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union) (Hamilton)
No. 17 · The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union) (Hamilton)
No. 18 · The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union) (Madison, with Hamilton)
No. 19 · The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union) (Madison, with Hamilton)
No. 20 · The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union) (Madison, with Hamilton)
No. 21 · Other Defects of the Present Confederation (Hamilton)
No. 22 · The Same Subject Continued (Other Defects of the Present Confederation) (Hamilton)
No. 23 · The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the Union (Hamilton)
No. 24 · The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered (Hamilton)
No. 25 · The Same Subject Continued (The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered) (Hamilton)
No. 26 · The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered (Hamilton)
No. 27 · The Same Subject Continued (The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered) (Hamilton)
No. 28 · The Same Subject Continued (The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered) (Hamilton)
No. 29 · Concerning the Militia (Hamilton)
No. 30 · Concerning the General Power of Taxation (Hamilton)
No. 31 · The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation) (Hamilton)
No. 32 · The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation) (Hamilton)
No. 33 · The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation) (Hamilton)
No. 34 · The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation) (Hamilton)
No. 35 · The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation) (Hamilton)
No. 36 · The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation) (Hamilton)
No. 37 · Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form of Government (Madison)
No. 38 · The Same Subject Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections to the New Plan Exposed (Madison)
No. 39 · The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles (Madison)
No. 40 · On the Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined and Sustained (Madison)
No. 41 · General View of the Powers Conferred by The Constitution (Madison)
No. 42 · The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered (Madison)
No. 43 · The Same Subject Continued (The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered) (Madison)
No. 44 · Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States (Madison)
No. 45 · The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State Governments (Madison)
No. 46 · The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared (Madison)
No. 47 · The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts (Madison)
No. 48 · These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No Constitutional Control Over Each Other (Madison)
No. 49 · Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government by Appealing to the People Through a Convention (Madison)
No. 50 · Periodical Appeals to the People Considered (Madison)
No. 51 · The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments (Madison)
No. 52 · The House of Representatives (Madison)
No. 53 · The Same Subject Continued (The House of Representatives) (Madison)
No. 54 · The Apportionment of Members Among the States (Madison)
No. 55 · The Total Number of the House of Representatives (Madison)
No. 56 · The Same Subject Continued (The Total Number of the House of Representatives) (Madison)
No. 57 · The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many Considered in Connection with Representation (Madison)
No. 58 · Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the Progress of Population Demands (Madison)
No. 59 · Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members (Hamilton)
No. 60 · The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members) (Hamilton)
No. 61 · The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members) (Hamilton)
No. 62 · The Senate (Madison)
No. 63 · The Senate Continued (Madison)
No. 64 · The Powers of the Senate (Jay)
No. 65 · The Powers of the Senate Continued (Hamilton)
No. 66 · Objections to the Power of the Senate To Set as a Court for Impeachments Further Considered (Hamilton)
No. 67 · The Executive Department (Hamilton)
No. 68 · The Mode of Electing the President (Hamilton)
No. 69 · The Real Character of the Executive (Hamilton)
No. 70 · The Executive Department Further Considered (Hamilton)
No. 71 · The Duration in Office of the Executive (Hamilton)
No. 72 · The Same Subject Continued, and Re-Eligibility of the Executive Considered (Hamilton)
No. 73 · The Provision For The Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power (Hamilton)
No. 74 · The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power of the Executive (Hamilton)
No. 75 · The Treaty-Making Power of the Executive (Hamilton)
No. 76 · The Appointing Power of the Executive (Hamilton)
No. 77 · The Appointing Power Continued and Other Powers of the Executive Considered (Hamilton)
No. 78 · The Judiciary Department (Hamilton)
No. 79 · The Judiciary Continued (Hamilton)
No. 80 · The Powers of the Judiciary (Hamilton)
No. 81 · The Judiciary Continued, and the Distribution of the Judicial Authority (Hamilton)
No. 82 · The Judiciary Continued (Hamilton)
No. 83 · The Judiciary Continued in Relation to Trial by Jury (Hamilton)
No. 84 · Certain General and Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution Considered and Answered (Hamilton)
No. 85 · Concluding Remarks (Hamilton)


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